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MASTER AND SERVANT - RELEASE - RELEASE OF A SERVANT ALSO
RELEASES THE MASTER FROM RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR LIABILITY
During the summer of 1979 Wallace and Karen Horejsi
employed Brenda Anderson, an eleven-year-old girl, to care for
their infant son, John.1 On July 2 Brenda beat John Horejsi,
causing severe and permanent injuries. 2 William Anton was
appointed guardian ad litem and brought an action on John's
behalf against Brenda Anderson, Brenda's parents, and Wallace
and Karen Horejsi. 3 The complaint alleged separate counts of
negligence against Brenda Anderson and John's parents, and
respondeat superior liability against both Brenda and John's
parents.
4
William Anton eventually settledJohn's claim against Brenda
Anderson and her parents.5 The Andersons obtained a full and
final release, which was approved by the court and discharged them
from all further claims arising out of the incident. 6 The Horejsi's
1. Horejsi v. Anderson, 353 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1984). Wallace and Karen Horejsi regularly
employed Brenda Anderson to care forJohn, who was less than a year old, while they were at work.
Id. at 317.
2. Id.
3. Id. William Anton isJohn Horejsi's grandfather. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. The claim against Brenda Anderson and her parents was settled for $25,000.00. Appendix
for Appellant at 15, Horejsi v. Anderson, 353 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1984).
6. Appendix for Appellant at 15, Horejsi v. Anderson, 353 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1984). The
release discharging Brenda Anderson and her parents contained, in pertinent part, the following
provision:
This release is intended to release only the parties specifically named, and the
undersigned expressly reserves any and all other claims, action, causes of action,
rights and demands of whatever kind or nature not hereby released which he may have
against any and all other persons, partnerships, associations, corporations, or other
legal entities not hereinbefore named or released arising out of said accident or for
injuries or damages resulting thereform [sic], it being intended and understood that
this release shall not release or discharge any other persons, partnerships, associations,
corporations or other legal entities except those hereinbefore named and released;
provided, however, that in accepting the aforementioned sum of money the
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then moved for summary judgment on the respondeat superior
claim, asserting that the release of their employee also released
them as employers. 7 The district court granted partial summary
judgment. 8 The question on appeal was whether the release of a
servant also released the master from respondeat superior liability. 9
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the release of a servant
also releases the master from vicarious liability. 1°  Horesi v.
Anderson, 353 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1984).
Although a multitude of reasons have been offered to justify
the vicarious liability of a master, 1 the modern justification for it is
based upon a deliberate allocation of risk. 12 The losses caused by
the torts of employees are placed upon the enterprise itself as a
required cost of doing business. 13  Despite the occasional
undersigned hereby releases and discharges that fraction, portion or percentage of the
total cause of action or claims for damages which the undersigned now has or may
hereafter possess against any and all parties responsible in any way for his damages as
may be determined by trial or other disposition to the sum of the fractions, portions or
percentages of causal negligence for which the above-named parties herein and hereby
released may be found to be liable to the undersigned as a consequence of the above-
mentioned accident, it being intended and understood that the entire claim and all
claims of the undersigned arising out of said accident against any other persons,
partnerships, associations, corporations or other legal entities shall be reduced to the
extent of the aforementioned amount paid to the undersigned as hereinbefore
mentioned and provided.
Id. at 15-16.
7. Horejsi, 353 N.W.2dat 317.
8. Id. John's negligence claim against his parents, based upon their hiring and retaining
Brenda, had not yet been tried when this appeal was heard. Id. at 317 n.l. The district court issued
an order to enter final judgment on the respondent superior count pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the
North Dakota Rules ofCivil Procedure. Id.
9. Id. at 317.
10. Id. at 318, 320.
11. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS S 69 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984). Some of the
reasons that have been advanced to support vicarious liability for a master are that the master has the
following:
a more or less fictitious "control" over the behavior of the servant; he has "set the
whole thing in motion," and is therefore responsible for what has happened; he has
selected the servant and trusted him, and so should suffer for his wrongs, rather than
an innocent stranger who has had no opportunity to protect himself; it is a great
concession that any man should be permitted to employ another at all, and there
should be a corresponding responsibility as the price to be paid for it - or, more
frankly and cynically, "In hard fact, the reason for the employers' liability is the
damages are taken from a deep pocket."
Id. (footnote omitted).
12. Id. The doctrine of vicarious liability of the employer for the torts of his employees "rests
upon the sound principle that, if an employer expects to derive certain advantages from the acts
performed by others for him, he, as well as the careless employee, should bear the financial
responsibility for injuries occurring to innocent third parties as a result of the negligent performance
of such acts." Laurie v. Mueller, 248 Minn. 1, 4, 78 N.W.2d 434, 437 (1956) (footnote omitted).
13. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, S 69. Losses caused by the tort of an employee are placed upon
the employer because he has engaged in an enterprise that, on the basis of past experience, involves
harm to others through the torts of employees. Id. The employer has sought to profit through the
enterprise and it is just that he, rather than an innocent injured third party, should bear the losses.
Id. The employer is better able to absorb and distribute these losses to the public through raised
prices, higher rates, or liability insurance. Id. An employer who is held strictly liable is under the
greatest incentive to exercise care in the selection, instruction, and supervision of his servants. Id.
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condemnation of the doctrine of respondeat superior, it is usually
justified as a cost of doing business, and has gradually extended the
employer's liability. 1
4
The question of whether the release of a servant also releases
the master from respondeat superior liability has frequently been
litigated in other jurisidctions; it is, however, one of first
impression in North Dakota.1 5  The common law rule in a
respondeat superior case is that a valid release of either of the
parties releases the other.1 6 This rule appears to have been based
either upon the theory that the recoverable tort damages are entire
and not severable, or upon the theory that an injured party is
entitled to only one compensation for his injury.1 7 In cases in which
the injured person expressly reserved his rights against another
tortfeasor, some authorities gave the reservation no effect,1 8 while
other authorities treated the release and reservation as a covenant
not to sue.' 9
Certain modern developments have ameliorated the rigidity of
the common law rule and the harshness of its application. 20 The
14. Id.
15. Horejsi, 353 N.W.2d at 317.
16. See Caldwell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 271 So. 2d 363, 364 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (release
of a carpet salesman, who was involved in a car accident, released employer despite reservation of
right against employer); Drinkard v. WilliamJ. Pulte, Inc., 48 Mich. App. 150, -, 210 N.W.2d
137, 143 (1973) ("a valid release of either the master or servant from liability for tort operates to
release the other where liability is based upon the doctrine ofrespondeant superior.. ")
17. See Sade v. Hemstrom, 205 Kan. 514, 471 P.2d 340 (1970). In Sade an employee of an
,engineering company was injured while repairing a pipeline owned by Northern Natural Gas
Company (Northern). Id. at __ , 471 P.2d at 341. After settling, the employee released Northern
from future claims, but reserved the right against the engineering company. Id. at -, 471 P.2d at
343. The Kansas Supreme Court determined that the settlement and release of Northern also
operated to release its servant, the engineering company. Id. at _ , 471 P.2d at 349. The court's
decision was "[based on the simple reasoning that an injured person can have but one satisfaction for
the same wrong... " Id. at __ , 471 P.2d at 347.
18. See Jacobson v. Parrill, 186 Kan. 467, -, 351 P.2d 194, 202 (1960) (settlement and
release of the driver of a car also released the owner of a car, despite plaintiff's reservation to sue
owner); Erickson v. Pearson, 211 Neb. 466 __ , 319 N.W.2d 76, 83 (1982) (insured's release of
insurance company also released insurance agent and agent's employee).
19. See Craven v. Lawson, 534 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Tenn. 1976) (a covenant not to sue the driver
of a car extinguished the derivative liability of the car's owner); Comment, Torts - Vicarious
Liability - Covenant Not to Sue Servant or Agent as Affecting Liability of Master or Principal, 44
Tenn. L. Rev. 188 (1976).
Section 285 of the second Restatement ofContracts provides:
(1) A contract not to sue is a contract under which the obligee of a duty promises never
to sue the obligor or a third person to enforce the duty or not to do so for a limited
time.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), a contract never to sue discharges the duty and a
contract not to sue for a limited time bars an action to enforce the duty during that
time.
(3) A contract not to sue one co-obligor bars levy of execution on the property of the
promisee during the agreed time but does not bar an action or the recovery of
judgment against any co-obligor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS S 285 (1981).
20. See Van Cleave v. Gamboni Constr. Co., 99 Nev. 502, -, 665 P.2d 250, 252 (covenant
not to sue one tortfeasor "does not release other joint tortfeasors even if it does not specifically
reserve rights against them"); Stanfield v. Laccoarce, 284 Or. 651, -, 588 P.2d 1271, 1278
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Restatement of Torts rejects the early common law rule and
maintains that a valid release of one tortfeasor should not discharge
another party who is liable for the same harm unless the parties to
the release expressly agree that the release will discharge others. 21
In addition to the Restatement, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, in 1939 and 1955,
approved the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.1
2
(plaintiff's covenant not to execute on any judgment against employee/son did not bar a suit against
employer/parents).
21. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS 5 885 (1977). Section 885 of the Restatement provides as
follows:
(1) A valid release of one tortfeasor from liability for a harm, given by the injured
person, does not discharge others liable for the same harm, unless it is agreed that it
will discharge them.
(2) A covenant not to sue one tortfeasor or not to proceed further against him does not
discharge any other tortfeasor liable for the same harm.
(3) A payment by any person made in compensation of a claim for a harm for which
others are liable as tortfeasors diminishes the claim against the tortfeasors, at least to
the extent of the payment made, whether or not the person making the payment is
liable to the injured person and whether or not it is so agreed at the time of payment or
the payment is made before or afterjudgment.
Id.
22. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 12 U.L.A. 57 historical note (1955).
Annot., 24 A.L.R.4th 547, 551 (1983). For a general discussion of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act, see Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1107, 1115 (1954). North Dakota's version of the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act is codified at section 32-38-01 of the North Dakota
Century Code and provides in pertinent part as follows:
1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, where two or more persons
become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property or
for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though
judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.
2. The right of contribution exists only in favor ofa tort-feasor who has paid more
than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is limited to the
amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tort-feasor is compelled to
make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the entire liability.
3. There is no right of contribution in favor of any tort-feasor who has
intentionally (willfully or wantonly) caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful
death.
4. A tort-feasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to
recover contribution from another tort-feasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful
death is not extinquished by the settlement nor in respect to any amount paid in a
settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-01 (1976).
Section 32-38-02 of the North Dakota Century Code, regarding pro rata shares, provides as
folllows:
In determining the pro rata shares oftort-feasors in the entire liability:
1. Their relative degrees of fault shall not be considered.
2. If equity requires the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a
single share.
3. Principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-02 (1976).
Section 32-38-04 of the North Dakota Century Code governs the treatment of a release or
convenant not to sue. Section 32-38-04 provides as follows:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good
faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same
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The Act was designed to change two well-established rules of law. 
23
The Act first sought to change the rule that the discharge of one
joint tortfeasor, either by satisfaction of a judgment or a release,
discharged all other joint tortfeasors.24 The Act also sought to
change the second rule that there is no contribution among joint
tortfeasors.
25
In 1957 North Dakota adopted the 1955 revised version of the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which is codified at
chapter 32-38 of the North Dakota Century Code.2 6 North Dakota
enacted its comparative negligence statute in 1973.27 The conflict
wrongful death:
1. It does not discharge any of the other tort-feasors from liability for the injury or
wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the others
to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount
of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater.
2. It discharges the tort-feasor to whom it is given from all laibility for
contribution to any other tort-feasor.
N.D. CENT. CODE. S 32-38-04 (1976).
23. Hackett v. Hyson, 72 R.I. 1132, __, 48 A.2d 353, 355 (1946).
24. Id. Courts have found various purposes underlying the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act. See Albert v. Dietz, 283 F. Supp. 854, 856 (D. Hawaii 1968) (created a right of
contribution unknown at common law, and made the right of contribution effective in practice);
Hayon v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 375 Mass. 644, - , 378 N.E.2d 442, 445 (1978) (achieved a
more equitable contribution among those liable in tort for same injury); Rio Grande Gas Co. v.
Stahmann Farms, Inc., 80 N.M. 432,.-, 457 P.2d 364, 366 (1969) (provided proportionate
allocation of burden among tortfeasors).
25. Hackett, 72 R.I. at __, 48 A.2d at 355. Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act, courts had been unwilling to provide a forum for wrongdoers. Kraft, The
North Dakota Equity for Tortfeasors Struggle -JudicialAction vs. Legislative Over-Reaction, 56 N.D.L. REV.
67, 69 (1980). Professor Kraft stated:
Joint tortfeasors were wrongdoers who intentionally caused injury or damage, and the
judicial system was unavailable as a forum for adjudicating disputes between [sic]
parties considered akin to criminals. A wronged plaintiff could proceed to judgment
against any one or more of the tortfeasors of his choice, and the tortfeasor who satisfied
the judgment was without recourse against his partners.
Id.
26. See N.D CENT. CODE 5 32-38-01 (1976). See supra note 22 for the pertinent sections of
chapter 32-38.
27. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 9-10-07 (1975). Section 9-10-07 of the North Dakota Century Code
provides as follows:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to
person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering. The
court may, and when requested by either party shall, direct the jury to find separate
special verdicts determining the amount of damages and the percentage of negligence
attributable to each party; and the court shall then reduce the amount of such damages
in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering. When
there are two or more persons who are jointly liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to
the percentage of negligence attributable to each, provided, however, that each shall remain jointly
and severally liablefor the whole award. Upon the request of any party, this section shall be
read by the court to the jury and the attorneys representing the parties may comment
to thejury regarding this section.
Id. (emphasis added).
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between the contribution act and the comparative negligence
statute was soon noted."' It was not until 1979, however, that the
North Dakota Supreme Court first interpreted the two conflicting
statutory enactments in Bartels v. City of Williston. 
29
The plaintiff in Bartels was a passenger who was seriously
injured when a Jeep, driven by its owner, went over a cliff and
landed on its roof.3 0 The accident occurred on property under the
control and possession of the City of Williston.31 Bartels released
the driver, Hackney, and his insurer for $50,000.00.32 He then
brought an action against the city, which brought a third-party
action against the released driver."3 The third-party defendant
moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the third-party
complaint.
3 4
In Bartels the United States District Court certified four
questions to the North Dakota Supreme Court concerning the
application of chapter 32-38 and section 9-10-07 of the North
Dakota Century Code to negligence claims. s5 In resolving and
answering the certified questions the North Dakota Supreme Court
asserted that it would consider all the pertinent statutory
provisions,3 6 their source,3 7 and their prior court construction.
3 8
28. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 16.7, at 262 (1974). When the 1939 Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was revised in 1955, the legislature abandoned degree of fault
as one of the factors to be considered when apportioning liability. Id. Instead, the legislature inserted
a provision that "[the parties'] relative degrees of fault shall not be considered." Id. Only two of the
comparative negligence states, North Dakota and Massachusetts, have adopted the 1955 version of
the Uniform Act. Id. In North Dakota this clause appears to have been superseded, at least in part,
by the provision in the comparative negligence statute that "contributions to awards shall be in
proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each." Id.
29. 276 N.W.2d 113, 121 (N.D. 1979).
30. Bartels v. City ofWilliston, 276 N.W.2d 113, 115 (N.D. 1979).
31. Id. The land was being used for mining sand and gravel for Williston's use and benefit and
was also leased to the city for potential use as a sanitary landfill site. Id.
32. Id. Bartels ratified the release under oath. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. Hackney moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id.
35. Id. With regard to the effect of a release, the following question was presented to the court:
In an action for negligence arising under North Dakota Century Code § 9-10-07, does
a release given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same
injury, pursuant to N.D.C.C. Ch. 32-38, discharge the tort-feasor to whom it is given
from all liability for contribution to any other tort-feasor?
Id.
36. Id. For the relevant portions of North Dakota Century Code SS 32-38-01, 32-38-02, and 32-
38-04, see supra note 21. For the text of § 9-10-07 of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note
27.
37. 276 N.W.2d at 115. The court in Bartels noted that thejoint tort-feasor contribution act was
derived from the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasor Act as devised by the Commission
on Uniform State Laws. Id. at 116. The court noted that North Dakota's comparative negligence
statute "was derived from the Minnesota comparative negligence statute enacted in 1969 which, in
turn, was based upon Wisconsin's [comparative negligence] statute." Id. at 118 (footnote omitted).
The North Dakota statute is identical to Minnesota's except for the last sentence, which was added to
the North Dakota provision. Id.
38. Id. If "a statute is taken from another state and adopted without change it is taken with the
construction placed upon it by the court of last resort of the state from whence it came." Id. (quoting
The court's examination in Bartels revealed that the comparative
negligence act, North Dakota Century Code section 9-10-07, was
enacted to eliminate the inequities of the contributory negligence
act, North Dakota Century Code chapter 32-38.19 The court noted
that it had a duty to apply two canons of statutory construction:
40
construe the statute so that its goals and objectives would be met;
41
and, apply the principle that a later legislative enactment prevails
over an earlier, irreconcilable provision.
42
After analyzing section 9-10-07 of the Code, the court
determined that North Dakota adopted pure comparative
negligence in cases involving more than one tortfeasor when it
enacted the comparative negligence act in 1975. 41 The court in
Bartels concluded that section 9-10-07 was the later-enacted
statute, 44 and thus, section 32-38-02(1) of the North Dakota
Century Code had been impliedly repealed by the enactment of
section 9-10-07 .45
Following this examination the supreme court concluded as
follows:
the following language of S 32-38-04(1), NDCC, as the
result of the enactment of § 9-10-07, NDCC, has been
impliedly repealed: 'of any amount stipulated by the
release or the covenant, or in the amount of
consideration, paid for it, whichever is the greater. 'And
has been substituted with the following underscored
language: 'of the relative degree of fault (percentage of
Hermanson v. Morrell, 252 N.W.2d 884, 889 (N.D. 1977)). When the legislature adopts another
state's statute, a statutory construction presumption arises that the legislature also adopts the other
state's judicial construction of the statute. Id.
The court in Bartels concluded that Minnesota adopted the Wisconsin statute along with the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's interpretations and constructions. 276 N.W.2d at 118. The court went
on to state that the North Dakota Legislature is presumed to have adopted pertinent pre-1973
Wisconsin and Minnesota case law involving comparative negligence. Id. at 119.
39. Id. at 120. The court in Bartels examined Minnesota and Wisconsin case law and determined
that the comparative negligence act was created "to eliminate the inequities under its predecessor,
the contributory negligence act, which permitted no recovery if that plaintiff was merely one percent
contributorily negligent." Id. The court in Bartels interpreted North Dakota's comparative
negligence act the way Minnesota and other states that have adopted the act have interpreted it. Id.
at 121.
40. Id.
41. See N.D. CENT. CODE SS 1-02-39 (1975) Section 1-02-39 in pertinent part provides: "If a
statute is ambigious, the court, in determining the intention of the legislation, may consider ... [tihe
object sought to be obtained." Id.
42. See N.D. CENT. CODE SS 1-02-09, 1-02-09.1, 1-02-09.2, 1-02-33 (1975 & Supp. 1985).
43. 276 N.W.2d at 121. The pure comparative negligence concept "contemplates the allocation
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negligence) attributable to the released joint tort-
feasors. '46
As a result, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the
general release that Bartels gave to Hackney released all of
Hackney's present and future liabilities, including contlfibutions
either specifically or by construction.4 7 Since Hackney was a
settling tortfeasor, he could not be included as a party in any
further action against any of the remaining nonsettling
tortfeasors. 48
Following the judicial amendment of section 32-38-04(1) in
Bartels, the court was asked to determine the effect of a release when
the vicarious liability of the master-servant relationship was
involved.4 9 In Horejsi, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that
a majority of states which have adopted the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act have held that a release of the servant does
not release the master. 50 John Horejsi's parents, the defendants,
urged the court to adopt the reasoning of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee, which refused to apply the Uniform Act to the
derivative or vicarious liability of masters or principals. 51
The court in Horejsi agreed with the defendants that the
Uniform Act applied to a master-servant relationship; as a result of
the determination in Bartels, however, the court found that section
32-38-04(1) of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
46. Id. Section 32-38-04, as impliedly amended by the enactment of § 9-10-07, in pertinent part
provides as follows:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment is given in
good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same
wrongful death:
1. It does not discharge any of the other tort-feasors from liability for the injury or
wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the others
to the extent of the relative degree of fault (percentage of negligence) attributable to
the released joint tort-feasors.
N.D. CENT. ConE § 32-38-04 (1976).
47. 276 N.W.2d at 122. The court further concluded "that the following language in S 9-10-07,
NDCC, 'provided . . . that each shall remain jointly and severally liable for the whole award' is for
the benefit of the injured party and can be waived." Id. In Bartels the plaintiff waived his right tojoint
and several liability and discharged the third-party defendant from all liability for contribution to
any other tort-feasor by executing the release. Id.
48. Id. The court noted that "Bartels' . . . recovery from the nonsettling tort-feasors is limited to
the percentage of negligence attributable to the remaining nonsettling tort-feasors as may be
determined by the court or jury." Id.
49. Horejsi v. Anderson, 353 N.W.2d 316, 317 (N.D. 1984).
50. Id. See Harris v. Aluminum Co. of America, 550 F. Supp. 1024, 1030 (W.D. Va. 1982)
(applying Virginia law); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Sweat, 568 P.2d 916, 930 (Alaska 1977); Holve v.
Draper, 95 Idaho 193, __, 505 P.2d 1265, 1268-69 (1973); Smith v. Raparot, 101 R.I. 565,__,
225 A.2d 666, 667 (1967).
51. 353 N.W.2d at 317. See also Craven v. Lawson, 534 S.W.2d 653 (Tenn. 1976). The court in
Craven stated that the Uniform Act under its own terms did not apply where there was a right to
indemnity. Id. The court reasoned that since the master had a right to indemnity from the servant,
the Uniform Act's provisions regarding the effect of releases or covenants not to sue did not embrace
a master whose liability was solely derivative. Id. at 656.
COMMENT
had been impliedly amended by the subsequent adoption of the
comparative negligence statute. 52 Therefore, the court concluded
that cases from other jurisdictions are inapposite to the situation in
North Dakota. 
5 3
In Horejsi the court examined the pro rata share section of the
North Dakota Century Code, which was not affected by the Bartels
decision. 54 The court noted the Commissioners' Comment to this
section, which asserts that the liability of a master for the wrong of
the servant should be treated as a single share. 55 The court in
Horejsi determined that section 32-38-04(1) requires that, when a
servant is released, the claim against nonreleased tortfeasors be
reduced by the percentage of negligence attributable to the released
servant. 56 The servant's percentage of negligence is attributed
jointly to the master and servant as a "single share" of liability. 5
7
Therefore, the court concluded that when the plaintiff releases the
negligent servant, the plaintiff can no longer recover damages from
either the master or servant. 58 The court in Horejsi thus held that
the release of the servant also released the master from any liability
based upon respondeat superior.
59
The defendant asserted that releasing the master would
discourage settlements and increase litigation, because future
plaintiffs, knowing that the master's liability will be automatically
discharged, will not settle with a servant. 60 While recognizing some
merit to this argument, the court stated that if it were to hold that
the vicarious liability of John's parents was not discharged by the
release, Brenda may still be liable to them for indemnity. 61 Brenda
would thus receive no protection from the settlement agreement. 62
52. 353 N.W.2d at 318. For the complete text of § 32-38-04(1) as impliedly amended by the
enactment of § 9-10-07, see supra note 45.
53. 353 N.W.2d at 318.
54. Id. Section 32-38-02 of the North Dakota Century Code, in pertinent part, provides that
"[iin determining the pro rata shares oftort-feasors in the entire liability[,] ... [ilfequity requires[,]
the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a single share." N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-
02 (1976).
55. 353 N.W.2d at 318.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. Because the percentage of negligence attributable to the negligent conduct of the servant
represents the "single share" of liability of both the master and servant, "the master is necessarily
released from vicarious liabilty for the released servant's misconduct." Id.
59. Id. at 320.
60. Id. at 318. While the court believed there was some merit toJohn's argument that releasing
the master would discourage settlements and encourage litigation, it also believed that the result he
advocated would be even more likely to discourage settlements. Id.
61. Id. The court in Horejsi noted that when a party has only derivative or vicarious liability for
damage, he is entitled to indemnity. Id. The court also stated that S 32-38-01(6) of the North Dakota
Century Code does not affect the right of a master to indemnity from his servant. Id. at 318-19. See
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-01 (1976).
62. 353 N.W.2d at 319.
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The court did not believe that the legislature intended such a
circuitous result. 
63
In its decision in Horejsi, the court expanded and clarified the
holding of Bartels by construing sections 32-38-02 and 32-38-04 of
the North Dakota Century Code together and applying them to a
situation involving the derivative or vicarious liability of masters or
principals. This decision by the court that the release of a servant
releases the master from vicarios liability eliminates any doubts for
future plaintiffs. Plaintiffs must now take the master's potential
vicarious liability into account when negotiating a settlement with
the negligent servant. Regardless of whether this decision will
encourage or discourage settlements in the future, the plaintiff will
no longer enter into a hasty settlement with a servant without
realizing that he has received the entire single share of liability
attributable jointly to the master and servant.
CAROL K. ERICKSON
63. Id. at 320 (citing Knutson v. Morton Foods, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 805, 812-14 (Tex. 1980)
(Garwood, J., concurring)). The court explained the circuity of the action by hypothesizing that
John could be required to reimburse Brenda for any amounts she had to pay John's parents as
indemnity. Id. at 319. The court stated that the release "provides that John shall indemnify the
Andersons and save, protect and hold them forever harmless from all and any claims for
contribution, indemnification, or otherwise, made by any persons .... - Id. Thus, the court noted that
if a judgment were entered against John's parents and they seek indemnification against Brenda, it
may be argued that John would have to reimburse Brenda for indemnity. Id. The court was
concerned that ifJohn would have to reimburse Brenda, he would receive no more than the amount
of the settlement he received from Brenda. Id.
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